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1  Introduction  
Good microeconomic policy requires two things. The first is a commitment to the 
entrenchment of well functioning markets and to letting market competition determine 
economic outcomes in all circumstances where competition is appropriate. The second is 
good regulations (that is, rules) to guide economic outcomes when competition is not 
appropriate.  
Two sorts of institutional strategies are required to attain good microeconomic policy 
foundations. Good regulations require good supporting institutions to implement and 
enforce the rules. So countries need to identify the institutional frameworks they will 
need to support good regulatory regimes. But no economy starts out with the best 
regulations or supporting institutions. Instead they inherit a set of regulations and 
institutions that reflect their own unique history. Further, economic growth and 
technological developments mean that the areas where competition is appropriate can 
change over time.  
Hence, countries also need to identify meta-institutional strategies that allow their 
existing regulatory structures and supporting institutions to evolve over time towards a 
changing ideal. In other words, they need to identify institutions to support the reform 
process itself.  
An earlier paper outlined in some detail the elements of good microeconomic policy, and 
the regulatory and institutional frameworks necessary to support it (Dee 2006). This 
paper briefly summarises the economic reform agenda, and elaborates further on 
institutional strategies to support the reform process.  
Key to this are mechanisms to review the desirability and performance of all existing and 
new regulations and institutions on an ongoing basis, and in a way that involves all 
relevant stakeholders. The purpose of these reviews is not just to inform the policy 
making process. Such reviews also play a vital role in marshalling countervailing 
interests against the vested interests opposed to reform. They also play a role in shaping 
and educating public opinion, and can over time raise significantly the level of public 
debate about economic policy reform options. Finally, they also assist in policy 
coordination.  
2  The microeconomic policy foundations of good 
economic performance 
The forces of competition can exert powerful pressure on producers to find the least cost 
way of serving customer needs, and to innovate in order to better serve those needs.   2 
Individual producers can benefit from any cost savings they make, in the form of higher 
profits. And consumers and downstream using industries can benefit as competition from 
other producers squeezes those profits and drives prices down towards costs. This 
dynamic process leads to prices that reflect production costs, and costs that are as low as 
possible. The first condition ensures allocative efficiency — resources are put to their 
best uses. The second ensures productive efficiency — the maximum output is achieved 
from those resources. Both types of efficiency ensure the highest possible levels of 
income. 
Not only does competition help to maximise income levels, but it does so in an 
administratively efficient way. In theory, the same patterns of production and 
consumption could be achieved through a system of centralised decision-making. But the 
administrative requirements for such central planning are burdensome, and the 
information requirements for doing it successfully are prohibitive. By contrast, the 
market place achieves these outcomes in a decentralised way. No bureaucrat needs to 
decide which individuals should run which companies producing which products at what 
price. For countries where regulatory capacities are in short supply, this can be a 
significant benefit from letting the market place decide.  
This is not to say that there are no administrative or legislative requirements for market 
competition. Basic laws are needed to set the boundaries of that competition. For 
example, corporations’ law is needed to allow for limited liability companies, thus 
limiting the downside risks to shareholders from poor corporate performance. Accounting 
standards and disclosure requirements are needed so that shareholders and creditors can 
assess the economic performance of companies in a transparent way. Bankruptcy laws 
are needed so as to limit the downside risks to outside creditors of poor corporate 
performance. But no case-by-case decisions are needed about which producers should 
survive and which should go out of business.    
Another benefit of competition and decentralised decision-making is that it can make an 
economy more flexible and robust to external shocks. Producers used to out-guessing 
rivals on a daily basis will be better placed to react to adverse global market 
developments than producers who have no rivals, or are used to being told what to do by 
bureaucrats. Furthermore, producers with rivals will have a financial incentive to be 
better informed than those rivals of likely global market developments. By contrast, 
bureaucrats have no profit motive to collect such information. Finally, producers with 
rivals are likely to be the best placed to respond to adverse shocks, because competition is 
likely to have weeded out the poorer performers. Small economies in particular need to 
be relatively open to global markets, because they do not have the variety of resources to 
produce everything at home. Flexibility is the key to protecting themselves from the 
variability of global markets. And competition can enhance flexibility.     3 
Potential rivals are as important as actual ones. Even a monopoly supplier will be unable 
to inflate costs or profits on a sustained basis if this attracts the entry of a competitor who 
can produce at lower cost or with a smaller profit margin. So long as it is possible for a 
competitor to enter at any time with few irreversible costs, this will discipline an 
incumbent’s behaviour. So the number of actual competitors is less important than the 
absence of barriers to entry and exit. Contestability is the key to effective competition. 
As a corollary, good microeconomic policy means protecting competition, not protecting 
particular competitors. The difference is crucial, although it is not always observed, even 
in the most enlightened economies. The benefits of competition will only emerge if firms 
and workers have the incentive to enter into or exit out of specific activities. Entry, exit or 
survival of any particular player should not be preserved by administrative means. There 
is a growing body of empirical literature that supports the idea that the entry and exit of 
firms is a key determinant of productivity in developing countries (Roberts and Tybout 
1997). 
Foreign competition can play an important part. It can come from allowing cross-border 
trade to occur in an unimpeded fashion. It can come from allowing foreign direct 
investment, so that foreign suppliers set up a permanent local presence. The latter sort of 
competition can bring additional benefits, in the form of new capital, technologies and 
business processes. But any attempt to ‘manage’ the process by allowing only a specific 
number of foreign players, rather than allowing free entry and exit of foreign players, is 
an instance of protecting particular competitors, rather than protecting competition. 
Further, such managed competition risks handing over existing monopoly profits from 
domestic to a few foreign players, with little benefit to domestic consumers and users in 
the form of lower prices, and a net loss to the economy as a whole. 
Competition from domestic new entrants is arguably even more important than foreign 
competition. A recent study examined the empirical evidence on the relative importance 
of discriminatory barriers to foreign competition, and non-discriminatory barriers to any 
new competition, among a group of East Asian economies. The results were striking. The 
gains to the region from unilaterally reforming the non-discriminatory restrictions on 
competition in seven selected services sectors were almost six times those from forming 
an East Asian preferential trade area, and three times those from a successful Doha 
Round (Dee 2005). East Asia need not fear that unleashing the forces of competition 
would see their economies overrun by foreign multinationals. The critical barriers to 
competition are often those protecting incumbents against domestic new entrants.    
Promoting competition is a much broader agenda than putting in place competition law, 
narrowly defined. Anti-trust legislation is about ensuring that abuses of monopoly power   4 
do not occur. Competition policy, broadly defined, is about removing the barriers to entry 
and exit so that positions of monopoly power do not persist.  
On the economic front, the competition policy agenda includes removing barriers to 
foreign competition, be it from cross-border trade or from foreign direct investment, and 
not just for particular trading partners. It includes removing barriers to the entry of 
domestic new entrants, and allowing existing firms to exit the marketplace in an orderly 
fashion if the market dictates that they cannot survive. It includes ensuring that the 
minimum regulation exists to guide economic outcomes in those circumstances when 
markets alone may not deliver the most efficient outcomes. And it includes ensuring that 
a cost-effective social safety net is in place to protect against adverse individual 
outcomes, having ensured individual opportunities.  
On the institutional front, the competition policy agenda includes ensuring that the right 
institutions are in place to review and remove the unnecessary impediments to the 
functioning of markets. It includes ensuring that the right institutions are in place to 
design, implement, enforce and review the functioning of more appropriate regulation. It 
includes devising strategies protect the credibility of those institutions, despite the 
inevitable attacks from special interests. It includes developing transparency of 
institutional processes, and nurturing an educated and informed commentariat, so as to 
bring economic policy making out of ‘smoke filled back rooms’ to help establish that 
credibility.  
3  An ideal policy development process 
Good economic policy does not just happen.1 It requires good processes, with the right 
institutions, to design new policies and to review existing ones.  
Figure 1 shows an ideal policy development process. The figure presupposes having 
certain institutions, or at least institutional divisions. However, the ideal development 
process does not depend on having those exact institutions — other institutions could 
perform the same functions, depending on the system of government. What is important 
is the functions themselves.  
 
 
                                            
1 Parts of this section are taken from Coghlan (2000), PC (1998) and Banks (2003).   5 
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At the very  end of the ideal process, a policy proposal is put to government by the 
responsible officials and Minister, and a decision is made as to the appropriate form of 
regulation or other policy action. In a parliamentary system, this decision is often made 
by Cabinet, a grouping of all government Ministers. When a Minister makes a 
submission to Cabinet, other Ministers can scrutinise the proposal, although this Cabinet 
scrutiny is typically not made public. In a presidential system, the decision may be made 
by the executive branch, with scrutiny only from within the presidential office.  
If the decision is to implement ‘black letter law’, then legislation will be drafted and 
tabled in the legislature. This allows for public debate and scrutiny by members of both 
the ruling government and opposition parties. If the decision is to institute lower level 
regulations of any sort, these will typically not be tabled in the legislature.   
Sometimes the policy development process does not work in an ideal fashion, and the 
above process is all that takes place, once a problem has been identified. In this case, 
there is very little scope for those other than the responsible Minister to have input into 
the decision-making process. And there is no public scrutiny, if at all, until after the 
decision is made.   
When the system works in an ideal fashion, a great deal of policy development work 
takes place before a proposal is put to government. This policy development process 
involves: 
•  review — an agency or panel reviews the problem and all its possible regulatory 
solutions (including dismantling existing regulation, if that is the cause of the 
problem); 
•  consultation — ideally, there would be two rounds of consultation with all relevant 
stakeholders, one at the inception of the review as the review panel or agency is 
starting to develop its ideas, and again after the preparation of a draft report that 
outlines the full analysis and possible regulatory solutions (sometimes, but not 
always, including a preferred solution at the draft stage). 
The review agency then puts a final report to government, which can provide input into 
the final government decision. 
Some institutional examples of good policy development process 
In Australia, for example, the initial policy review and consultation is sometimes 
undertaken by an agency called the Productivity Commission. While this particular 
agency is rarely found in its exact form in other countries, it has three key attributes that 
ensure high quality regulatory review.     7 
•  Statutory independence — the agency is established via an Act of Parliament as a 
statutorily independent agency, meaning that it is not bound by current government 
policy. Hence, in conducting its reviews, its reports can be openly critical of current 
government regulatory initiatives, and of government policy more broadly. The 
ability to provide a full critique of current regulation is a necessary first step in 
proposing regulatory reforms. Nevertheless, an organisation of this sort needs to have 
the resources to ensure that its critical analysis is of the highest possible quality, if it is 
to survive.  
•  An economy-wide view — the agency is required to look beyond narrow sectional 
interests, and to consider net gains to the economy as a whole. This requirement has 
been seen as sufficiently critical to be formally enshrined as a policy guideline in the 
legislation creating the agency.  
•  Transparent processes — the agency conducts public hearings, which ensures the 
transparency of the arguments and analysis put to it. The agency’s reports to 
government are also made public, which ensures the transparency of its own advice to 
government. Transparent processes bolster the ability of at least some countervailing 
interests to marshal against particular vested interests, so helping to ensure that an 
economy-wide view will be taken by policy makers. This can also relieve the 
government from having to marshal those countervailing interests itself.  
A requirement to take an economy-wide view is critical, and a requirement to consult 
widely is not enough, for two reasons. Without a requirement to take all views into 
account, a review agency may simply ignore some views. More importantly, one key 
group of stakeholders — consumers — rarely participate in public consultation processes. 
In many countries, consumer interest groups are active on consumer safety issues, but 
rarely participate on matters of economic efficiency. Having a review agency required to 
take an economy-wide view ensures that consumer interests are taken into account, as 
well as the interests of producers and downstream using industries. This is better 
accomplished if the agency has the analytical resources, including skills in partial and 
general equilibrium modelling and cost benefit analysis, to estimate the gains or losses in 
consumer surplus as well as producer surplus from any reform initiative.  
Such an agency cannot possibly undertake the policy development for every single policy 
proposal. But it is particularly useful in those policy areas where there are major potential 
efficiency or other payoffs to the community from change, but where existing 
entitlements create resistance to reform. Referring such issues to a statutorily independent 
body can help to de-politicise them, and allow breathing space for more careful analysis.  
The government need not be bound by the recommendations of such an agency. For 
example, in Australia the government quite frequently modifies aspects of the   8 
recommendations made by the Productivity Commission when implementing them, and 
occasionally rejects its recommendations, in whole or in part. Indeed, this is the ‘other 
side of the coin’ to its statutory independence. Nevertheless, an agency can still have 
influence, even if it can be ignored, for several reasons: 
•  transparent processes have influence, and such an agency can ‘name and shame’ the 
beneficiaries of special-interest policy deals; and  
•  ideas have influence, and such an agency can present reform proposals with high-
quality intellectual backing.  
The credibility of such an organisation is enhanced if, as noted, it has the resources to 
ensure that its analysis is of the highest quality. Credibility may also be enhanced if it can 
maintain the status of an ‘honest broker’, mediating among the special interests and 
making recommendations, but not becoming involved in the politics of the subsequent 
decision-making. If it is to remain ‘above the fray’, but if its ideas are to have influence, 
its ideas need to be championed, or at least debated, by others. Thus an educated and 
literate commentariat has an important role in adding credibility to an independent review 
institution. Alternatively, a review agency could credibly remain involved in the 
subsequent decision-making, so long as it had no clear conflict of interest. However, this 
involvement would divert resources from its review tasks.   
A statutorily independent review body is not the only type of organisation that could 
carry out the review and consultation phases of policy development. Government 
departments can develop their own consultation mechanisms, such as holding round-
tables of relevant stakeholders or asking for written submissions from interested parties, 
as input to their own policy development processes. Such consultations are facilitated by 
e-government initiatives, and may be effective in eliciting countervailing producer 
interests.  
Inter-departmental committee processes convened by a ‘central agency’ department (such 
as a Finance Ministry or Presidential office) can also bring a number of stakeholder 
interests to bear by proxy, through the representative departments. Inter-departmental 
processes can be important in themselves for ensuring policy coherence among the 
different departments, so long as the central coordinating agency has the authority to 
ensure that final committee decisions are honoured. Coordinating agencies that have 
control over the purse strings are generally in a strong position in this regard. So too are 
agencies that control access to leaders. The lack of interdepartmental coordination has 
been identified as a major cause of policy incoherence in Indonesia’s sugar trade policy 
(Stapleton 2006).    9 
However, neither departmental consultations or inter-departmental committees always 
ensure that consumer interests are taken into account. Further, public consultation is often 
limited to the first round of consultation shown in Figure 1. Not often do government 
departments or inter-departmental committees circulate their own reform proposals for 
public comment once they have been tentatively formulated.   
Another type of review mechanism is to convene a review panel of eminent persons on a 
once-off basis to consider a particular issue. Such panels often rely on the integrity of 
individual appointees for their independence and impartiality. For example, appointees 
who come from an independent judicial background may maintain that independence in a 
review context, while more overtly ‘political’ appointees may be neither independent nor 
impartial. Such panels also depend for their effectiveness on their terms of reference, 
which may direct them to take a broad or narrow focus on a particular issue. And terms of 
reference that are tailor-made to a particular issue are more likely to be manipulated than 
policy guidelines that need to be applied across a whole range of issues. Resourcing such 
panels with a well-trained secretariat from the bureaucracy can provide the skills to carry 
out economy-wide analysis, but is not sufficient to ensure that it is actually carried out.  
Finally, a bicameral system of government can sometimes provide one other important 
mechanism of policy review. Upper houses of government can sometimes instigate their 
own reviews of legislation before it is voted on in the upper house. The reviews may 
included public consultation, and may be a useful final screening mechanism. But they 
are typically highly charged politically, and occur too late in the policy development 
process to have a major influence on policy design.  
Policy assessment procedures  
Good regulatory design therefore requires stringent ex ante assessment procedures. But 
because these are themselves costly, time-consuming and seen as ‘getting in the way of 
regulators going their job’, there may also need to be independent verification that that ex 
ante assessment procedures are used. Improved transparency and independent assessment 
can also help to provide greater discipline on policy-making.  
A major vehicle for ensuring quality control is regulatory impact analysis, which calls for 
an economy-wide perspective in identifying who benefits from the regulations, who 
incurs the costs and whether the regulation achieves its objectives without excessively 
burdening the community. For example, the Australian Government has declared that a 
regulatory impact statement (RIS) must be prepared and presented at two stages (see 
Figure 1): 
   10
•  Stage 1: when the proposal goes to the decision maker; and  
•  Stage 2 : when the proposal is tabled in the legislature (thereby making the RIS 
publicly available). 
The elements of a regulatory impact statement are shown in Box 1. This assessment 
forces policymakers to work through a sequential process of articulating the problem, 
assessing a range of options and recommending the best option or explaining why some 
other option is recommended. The third element, setting out some viable options as to 
how the desired objectives might be achieved, prompts officials to work through all the 
possibilities on the regulatory spectrum. Taken together, all the element of a regulatry 
impact assessment essentially constitute a systematic policy development process 
designed to implement the principles of good regulation. 
Box 1  Elements of a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) 
A RIS has seven key elements which set out: 
•  The problem or circumstances which give rise to the need for action 
•  The desired objective(s) 
•  The options (regulatory and non-regulatory) that may constitute viable means for 
achieving the desired objective(s) 
•  An assessment of the impact (costs and benefits) on consumers, business, government 
and the community of each option (including the impact on small business paperwork 
and compliance costs) 
•  A consultation statement (the process and results of consultation) 
•  A recommended option 
•  A strategy  to implement (including consideration of appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms) and review the preferred option 
The regulatory impact assessment process can be useful quite early in the policy 
development process. An assessment prepared early can serve as a consultation document 
and draw out the views and data from those likely to be affected. An early assessment can 
also provide regulatory discipline that otherwise may not occur when policy making does 
not culminate in an explicit or ‘black letter’ law regulatory solution.  
Regulatory impact assessments can also be used ex post to verify that stringent policy 
assessment procedures have been followed. If such ex post assessments are made 
mandatory, there needs to be an agency responsible for ensuring that all government 
departments and regulatory agencies prepare and submit assessments of a satisfactory 
standard. Ideally, it should publish an annual report on their compliance with the 
assessment processes.    11
Requiring rigorous regulatory impact assessment procedures can potentially promote a 
significant ‘cultural change’ among officials and the government. It challenges the 
traditional regulate-first approach, encourages assessment of non-regulatory options and 
seeks more careful selection and better justification of the preferred option. When the 
assessment documentation is made available to the public, the process can also make the 
government and its officials more accountable for policy choices and promote improved 
transparency in policy making.  
For a regulatory impact assessment process to make a useful contribution, there needs to 
be an orderly policy development process and the regulatory assessment needs to be done 
early enough to articulate viable options before positions become locked in. Quite often, 
policy making does not fit this model. Rather, policymaking often results from political 
imperatives calling for quick action, from deals with particular interest groups and from 
bargaining between political interests or parties. Sometimes these approaches result on 
good regulatory outcomes, but the risk of failing to do so is undoubtedly higher than in 
cases where a more open and orderly policy development process is adopted.  
Even then, a regulatory impact assessment may be prepared too late, in which case it 
becomes no more than an apology or rationalisation for the preferred option, in stark 
contrast to its intended role of setting out an even-handed description and assessment of 
all the viable options and their likely impacts. Making regulatory impact assessments 
mandatory towards the end of the policy making process (as in Figure 1) may impose 
discipline on that process. Having independent policy development agencies who can 
carry out regulatory impact assessment procedures as an integral part of their policy-
making process may be preferable, especially in high-impact areas.  
Much policy-making is incremental or evolutionary in nature, as modifications are made 
to improve or refine existing law. If the regulatory base is flawed, quality control 
processes focusing on changes to that base may sometimes have limited effect. Therefore, 
governments occasionally need to institute complete reviews of related sections of the 
law, using a systematic framework such as provided by a regulatory impact assessment. 
Such reviews could usefully focus on identifying any potentially anti-competitive 
elements in the existing stock of legislation.  
However, departments and regulatory agencies may not have sufficient skilled staff to 
prepare regulatory impact assessments themselves. The officials making regulations have 
widely different specialist skills, such as engineering, pharmaceutical chemistry and the 
law. But they may be poorly placed to identify and assess the likely costs and benefits of 
different regulatory options. This again argues for an independent review agency staffed 
with economic specialists to undertake regulatory impact assessment type processes early 
in the policy development process.    12
4  What can go wrong? 
There are three possible reasons why good microeconomic policy reforms are not 
adopted.2 Each has different implications for the type of institutional changes that could 
better support the reform process.   
•  Governments do not know what is regulatory ‘best (or better) practice’. This argues 
for external assistance to governments to provide the expertise to undertake 
systematic reviews of existing regulatory arrangements, and to evaluate regulatory 
alternatives. It also argues for an international exchange of regulatory experience to 
raise awareness of what constitutes better practice, as has occurred to date through 
APEC.  
•  Governments know what is ‘better practice’, but face political resistance from vested 
interests. This argues for government-sponsored transparency institutions (such as the 
Productivity Commission, or institutions that perform similar functions), which are 
different from independent regulators. It also argues for an international exchange of 
experience about how to strengthen domestic institutions in favour of the public 
interest.  
•  Governments do not want good policy, because they rely on the rents from bad 
policies for political funding purposes. In these circumstances, government-sponsored 
transparency institutions will be sidelined, as appears to have happened with the 
National Economic and Development Authority in the Philippines. However, there is 
a role for private (or otherwise independent) transparency mechanisms to carry out 
the necessary work of scrutiny.  
The first reason is relatively straightforward. The latter two require some elaboration.  
In all political systems, governments require a mandate of some sort, but a key question 
is how that mandate is cultivated. At one extreme, an elected government with a 
comfortable electoral margin could choose to implement an economic reform agenda in a 
‘crash through or crash’ style — simply implementing reforms until the cumulative 
opposition from vested interests and/or public opinion erodes their electoral margin. 
Alternatively, they could attempt to influence the terms of the debate.  
For example, one powerful way to counter the views of vested interests is by marshalling 
the views of countervailing interests, as noted above. A policy review mechanism that 
encourages broad participation of all interested parties is a good way of marshalling such 
opposing views. Similarly, one way to counter a nationalistic public sentiment against 
‘selling the nation’ may be to publicly release a study by independent experts of the 
                                            
2 The following taxonomy is due to Ross Garnaut.   13
various ways in which consumer and producer wellbeing could be promoted in the 
provision of public services. Over time, a debate about ‘selling the nation’ may thus be 
transformed into a much more nuanced debate about the relative merits of competition 
versus privatisation, for example, and whether one has any bearing on the other.   
A reform program that makes provision for careful reviews of the desirability and 
performance of all existing and new regulations and institutions on an ongoing basis, in a 
way that involves all relevant stakeholders, may be slower than a ‘crash through or crash’ 
program. But it is likely to be more sustainable in the longer term. This is because the 
reviews will not just inform public policy-making, they will also play a role in setting the 
agenda for public debate. Indeed, it is this agenda-setting role of independent, transparent 
reviews that ensures that they can have influence, even if the government itself does not 
want good policy.  
Independent, transparent, economy-wide policy reviews have a role in managing a 
diversity of opinion outside of government circles, because they can influence the terms 
of the debate. But governments with an economic reform agenda also have to manage a 
diversity of opinion within government. Good processes of policy coordination are 
required to ensure that all relevant ministries are consulted. But mechanisms are also 
required to ensure that final decisions reflect the public interest, not just narrow sectional 
interests. Providing a coordinating role to agencies with broad, horizontal portfolio 
responsibilities can play a central role, as has happened through the Council on Economic 
and Fiscal Policy in Japan. Arming such agencies with high-quality, independent policy 
reviews can also strengthen the public interest during the coordination process. Finally, 
mechanisms are required to ensure that coordinated decisions are abided by. A threat of 
budgetary sanction is one mechanism. Threat of exposure through ex post reviews is 
another.  
5  How can regional processes help? 
Independent, transparent, economy-wide policy reviews are thus central, not just to 
identifying better regulatory practice, but also to ‘selling’ it in the face of opposition from 
vested interests, overly simplistic public opinion and/or bureaucratic or Ministerial 
sabotage. 
Regional processes such as APEC could provide a range of assistance in conducting 
independent, transparent, economy-wide policy reviews — from marshalling external 
expertise for such reviews, to providing a forum for the exchange of experience about the 
conduct of such reviews. But if regional assistance is to be useful, it needs to help with 
the policy ‘selling’ function as much as with the policy identification function. 
Accordingly, regional assistance needs to be tapped into actual policy making processes,   14
with mechanisms to ensure real contact with stakeholders (to manage diversity of opinion 
outside government), and real follow-up from Ministers and the bureaucracy (to manage 
diversity of opinion inside government).  
Giving regional assistance mechanisms a point of contact with responsible Ministers, and 
holding the responsible Ministers accountable for stakeholder contact and bureaucratic 
follow-up and Ministerial coordination, would be one way to ensure this. The particular 
Minister responsible would vary from one instance to the next, depending on the scope 
and subject matter of the review. But each Minister would be likely to welcome the 
opportunity, since they would benefit most from the chance to de-politicise sensitive or 
divisive issues by referring them for independent policy review.   
The APEC Economic Committee is one possible forum in which Ministers could identify 
the reform priorities for individual countries or groups of countries, and in which relevant 
Ministers could self-select for regional assistance in undertaking independent policy 
reviews. Regional assistance could be in the form of drawing up terms of reference for 
such reviews through an office serving the Economic Committee, and marshalling the 
collective expertise available in independent think tanks and elsewhere around the region 
for undertaking such reviews. Ministers could usefully also agree in advance that such 
reviews should follow standard policy guidelines of independence, transparency and an 
economy-wide view.  
The relevant Ministers would need to organise forums for contact with relevant 
stakeholders (including government departments) during the course of such reviews, to 
help marshal all points of view. It is an open question how many rounds of stakeholder 
meetings would be appropriate, but it is important that they be open to the public. It is 
also critical that the resulting review document be made public. This could be ensured by 
a policy guideline that required the responsible Minister to release the final document 
within a specified time of its completion. Finally, the responsible Minister should be 
required to have the review document given due consideration by all relevant Ministers 
with a country, also within a specified time frame. The lead Ministers could not be held 
accountable for the outcomes of that consideration, since that would be a matter for all 
Ministers. Nevertheless, a requirement to have the matter considered could provide the 
lead Ministers with a mandate for Ministerial coordination, where such mechanisms 
might be lacking at the moment.  
This method of organising regional assistance for independent policy reviews differs 
from one based on an OECD-style secretariat, essentially by putting lead Ministers in the 
driving seat, ensuring their ownership and accountability from the outset. This is critical, 
since the prime purpose of such reviews is not just the identification of ‘better practice’, 
but also the selling of it domestically. An office of some sort would still be required to   15
service the process, through writing terms of reference, commissioning the services of 
independent researchers to undertake reviews, providing intellectual leadership and 
guidance for such reviews, and perhaps assisting the lead Minister to organise 
stakeholder consultation and Ministerial follow-up (where their own bureaucratic 
resources for such efforts were scarce). But the process would be under the APEC 
Economic Committee and the lead Ministers themselves.  
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